Un informe oficial italiano implica en el crimen de Atocha al 'ultra' Cicuttini, relacionado con Gladio, El País, December 2, 1990 (in Spanish) newspapers closest to the left, as well as the radio and television centres. Newspaper agencies were to be occupied strictly for the time only that it takes to destroy

Operation Gladio TruthMove - Operation Gladio

Even the planning and preparation of clandestine networks in areas of the country most vulnerable to invasion falls within the duties of the State. But the protection of the clandestine nature necessitated by these networks does not mean that they should be clandestine to the very same institutions within which they operate. The creation of these networks must always occur formally, respecting the law and the Constitution. To keep them covert is an entirely different question. When Greece joined NATO in 1952, the country's special forces, LOK ( Lochoi Oreinōn Katadromōn, i.e., "mountain raiding companies"), were integrated into the European stay-behind network. The CIA and LOK reconfirmed on March 25, 1955, their mutual cooperation in a secret document signed by US General Truscott for the CIA, and Konstantinos Dovas, chief of staff of the Greek military. In addition to preparing for a Soviet invasion, the CIA instructed LOK to prevent a leftist coup. Former CIA agent Philip Agee, who was sharply criticized in the US for having revealed sensitive information, insisted that "paramilitary groups, directed by CIA officers, operated in the sixties throughout Europe [and he stressed that] perhaps no activity of the CIA could be as clearly linked to the possibility of internal subversion." [46] Les procès Andreotti en Italie" ("The Andreotti trials in Italy") by Philippe Foro, published by University of Toulouse II, Groupe de recherche sur l'histoire immédiate (Study group on immediate history). (in French) On the 7th of April 1952 a member of British intelligence, Peter Frazier, sent a letter to the head of SIFAR informing him of the creation of a planning committee formed by the representatives of the French, British, and American secret services, encouraged by and under the auspices of SACEUR ( Supreme Allied Commander Europe). 10 SACEUR is the commander of NATO’s Allied Command Operations and the director of its headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The position has always been held by a U.S. military officer. Defense minister Poncelet replied in the Belgian Senate that the plan was only an internal draft proposal, which was never approved by the military command or the defense minister himself. [26]

The American Gladio Arm

A first level, formed by elements that would remain in occupied territory. They were to be difficult to detect, “unsuspectable”, gathered in cell structures, and subdivided by operational specialisation; maximum energy and decisiveness, free of any doubts or indecisiveness' and, as the Gladio investigation put it, made his men 'feverish and biting'. After the training course with British intelligence – which, however, seems not to have taken place – one of the chosen officials (Felice Santini, Colonel of the Italian Air Force) would assume his duties as the general coordinator of the new network, while the other six would take control of its operative branches: intelligence, sabotage, propaganda, communications, cipher, and exfiltration. The topics covered during these meetings changed according to the phases of development of the organisation. In the three years 1956-1958, these mostly related to establishing and mobilising the training centres of Capo Marargiu (CAG) and Olmedo (a communications base). The issues most frequently involved financial concerns and the transmission of documentation and training materials.

Inside Operation Gladio: NATO’s Covert Cold War Strategy

Secondly, the commission faced time-related problems. The time allotted to the commission was initially five months, a period which the final report deplored as "very little" and short in comparison to other inquiries. The Senate granted on July 12, 1991, a request for extra time, which enabled the committee to work for another three months. Unfortunately most of the allotted time fell during the parliamentary recess, which further frustrated the effort to fully pursue the intended lines of inquiry. For instance, the commission had planned to interview several investigative journalists, people like Richard Brenneke and had requested several " dossiers chauds" (English: "hot cases"). [ clarification needed] Handled material and major findings [ edit ] In 1990, then-Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers told the Dutch Parliament that his office was running a secret organisation that had been set up inside the Dutch defence ministry in the 1950s, but denied it was supervised directly by NATO or other foreign bodies. He went on to inform that successive prime ministers and defence chiefs had always preferred not to inform other Cabinet members or Parliament about the secret organization. It was modelled on the nation's World War II experiences of having to evacuate the royal family and transfer government to a government-in-exile, [52] originally aiming to provide an underground intelligence network to a government-in-exile in the event of a foreign invasion, although it included elements of guerilla warfare. Former Dutch Defence Minister Henk Vredeling confirmed the group had set up arms caches around the Netherlands for sabotage purposes. [52] Questions relating to the general structure of the organisation and recruiting external personnel were also discussed, though with less urgency (particularly on the Italian side). Above all else, SIFAR was concerned with questions regarding the use of training centres for its own aims.Indicios de que la red Gladio utilizó una vieja estación de la NASA en Gran Canaria, El País, November 26, 1990 (in Spanish) The improvement of our information on the subject of Cominform and potential enemy activities in so far as they concern our two countries.