From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Second Revised Edition

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Realism, now logicism, "Realism, as the word is used in connection with the mediaeval controversy over universals, is the Platonic doctrine that universals or abstract entities have being independently of the mind; the mind may discover them but cannot create them." Montague, R. (1970) ‘English as a Formal Language’, in B. Visentini et al., Linguaggi Nella Societa e Nella Tecnica, Edizioni di Communita, Milan.

Pakaluk, Michael (1989). "Quine's 1946 Lectures on Hume". Journal of the History of Philosophy. 27 (3): 445–459. As previously reported, in other occasions Quine used the term "neurology" instead of "empirical psychology". [31] Zhai YH, Qu KS (2009) On characteristics of information system homomorphisms. Theory Comput Syst 44:414–431 Quine makes absurd the notion that Pegasus exists (even though not in flesh and blood) with the mind experiment given here: "Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway?" To admit that each 'idea' of the man is a separate existing entity is silly. Grattan-Guinness, Ivor, 2000. The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870–1940. Princeton University Press.Agrawal R, Mannila H, Srikant R, Toivonen H, Verkamo AI (1996) Advances in knowledge discovery and data mining, chap. Fast discovery of association rules. American Association for Artificial Intelligence, pp 307–328 Wille R (1982) Restructuring lattice theory: an approach based on hierarchies of concepts. Formal Concept Anal 83:445–470 C. Provide a thesis statement explaining your stance and why you feel that way (known as proposito and partitio ) This text treats the problem of significant sequences (phonemes and morphemes) in speech and the notion of synonymy.

conceptualism, now intuitionism "Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made." Keeping Quine’s naturalism and holism in mind, it is pretty clear why he rejects the main tenets of logical positivism. First, Quine points out the vagueness of what philosophers mean when they talk about ‘analytic statements’. The classic case of an analytic statement is “all bachelors are unmarried,” which is true by definition: since a bachelor is defined as an unmarried man, it could not be otherwise that bachelors are unmarried. But note that this relies on the idea that ‘bachelor’ has the same ‘meaning’ as the phrase ‘unmarried man’. But what is a ‘meaning’? It sounds like a mental phenomenon; and because Quine does not hold minds to exist, he is very skeptical about ‘meanings’. So in what sense do ‘meanings’ exist? Can they be paraphrased into behavioral terminology? Quine does not exactly rule it out, but is rather dubious. Sarmah AK, Hazarika SM, Sinha SK (2013) Formal concept analysis: current trends and directions. Artif Intell Rev, pp 1–40. doi: 10.1007/s10462-013-9404-0. In this text, Quine gives comments on the theory of reference and modal contexts (e.g., possibility, necessity). Quine, W. V. (1966). "The Ways of Paradox". The Ways of Paradox, and Other Essays. New York: Random House.Dekel U (2003) Revealing java class structure with concept lattices, Master’s thesis, Master’s thesis, Technion -Israel Institute of Technology In philosophy of mathematics, he and his Harvard colleague Hilary Putnam developed the Quine–Putnam indispensability thesis, an argument for the reality of mathematical entities. [11]